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INTRODUCTION

Throughout its first forty-eight years of life, the federal Medicaid statute
lacked a viable insurance pathway for most low-income adults' ineligible for
employer-sponsored coverage. In what is arguably the most important public
health achievement since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid fifty years ago,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)2 fundamentally alters this
picture. Building on earlier breakthroughs for children, the ACA restructures
Medicaid to cover poor adults and juxtaposes its new architecture against an
affordable and accessible private insurance market for people ineligible for
employer-sponsored or government insurance.
These reforms have already produced measurable results. But they also hold
important implications for the future of Medicaid. Since its creation, Medicaid has
permitted states to use federal funding to purchase private health insurance. Until
the ACA, however, there was essentially nothing to buy. Now, by pairing the
largest of all need-based programs-one infused with the concept of social
contract-with an affordable private insurance market, the ACA undoubtedly has
set the stage for profound changes over time in how Medicaid functions. This
transformation in how Medicaid is designed and administered was, in fact,
discussed during the legislative run-up to the ACA's enactment, but nothing came
of it. Now, through a terrible twist of fate, this transformation is happening
anyway, in the form of large-scale federal demonstrations-negotiated in the main
out of public view3 -in an intense bid to undo the damage to the Medicaid
* Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor and Founding Chair, Department of Health Law and Policy,
Milken Institute School of Public Health, George Washington University.
1. In this essay the term includes people who live in families with household incomes up to
twice the federal poverty level.
2. The ACA actually consists of two laws: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
(HCERA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, enacted immediately following the ACA's
passage.
3. Federal regulations require that demonstration proposals submitted by states and authorized
by section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012), be publicly posted for notice
and comment. 42 C.F.R. §431.416(b) (2012). States also must permit comments once the
demonstration begins. 42 C.F.R. §431.420(c) (2012). But like other CMS Medicaid policy-making
regulatory processes, the actual negotiation process is closely held.
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expansion caused by the United States Supreme Court's decision in National
Federationof IndependentBusiness v. Sebelius.4
The demonstrations approved to date have largely succeeded in generating
state buy-in to the adult expansion without unraveling core Medicaid safeguards
for the poor. But whether the Obama Administration, now in its twilight and eager
to get states on board,5 can or will continue to hold the line is anyone's guess. And
with a private insurance market there to impose direct pressure on Medicaid, will
a new Congress-politically light years away from the one that enacted the ACAsweep away Medicaid's remaining vestiges for that part of the Medicaid
population whose eligibility is based on income alone? If so, what will be lost?
Following a background, on public and private health insurance for the poor
prior to enactment of the ACA, I discuss the competing visions for low-income
Americans created under the Act and the extent to which the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary's use of her Medicaid demonstration
powers may be moving Medicaid increasingly in the direction of a subsidy
program for private insurance products. I also describe the ways in which the HHS
Secretary has held the line on Medicaid's foundational elements and what this
political deal-making means for the 1 14 th Congress that convenes in January 2015,
which promises to be one in which many of Medicaid's basic tenets will be reexamined, and potentially, fundamentally altered.
I. BACKGROUND

A. PrivateHealth Insurancefor the Poor, Pre-A CA
Although legally it always could do so, Medicaid did not face real pressure to
buy private insurance in the pre-ACA time period because, for its beneficiaries,
there was basically nothing to buy.6 The "accident of history"7 that became the
voluntary system of employer coverage we know today has always been inherently
irrational for low-wage workers. Employer insurance reached a zenith of sorts
around the mid-1970s, covering around 70 percent of the U.S. working-age
population, and has been declining since.8 In 1984, following a deep recession that
4. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

5. Just how eager the Administration may be to use its section 1115 authority to move further
on the Medicaid expansion can be seen in HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell's Medicaid expansion
outreach to Republican Governors immediately following the 2014 mid-term elections. Susan
Ferrechio, HHS Secretary to Tuesday's GubernatorialWinners: Call Me, WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 4,
2014, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/hhs-secretary-to-tuesdays-gubernatorial-winners-callme/article/255568 1.
6. Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health
Insurance-The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013).
7. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurancein the United States-Originsand
Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 (2006).
8. Jon Gabel, Job-BasedHealth Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental System Under Scrutiny,
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significantly increased the number of uninsured people, less than a quarter of
nonelderly low-wage earners reported workplace coverage.9 By 2012, after several
more recession and recovery cycles, the proportion of poor nonelderly Americans
with workplace coverage had fallen by half, to slightly more than 13 percent.'0 The
decline was equally precipitous among the near-poor; among workers with family
incomes between one and two times the federal poverty level, employer coverage
rates fell from nearly 62 percent to less than one-third." These figures were
consistently worse for children, a fact that helped propel the Medicaid expansions
of the 1980s. 12 In 2012, less than 9 percent of poor children had employer
coverage; among near-poor families, children's coverage stood at less than 30
percent. 3
Without employer insurance there was no private insurance alternative to
speak of. Health insurance trend data covering the same 1984-2012 time period
show that even when all sources of private insurance were taken into account, the
proportion of low-income Americans with private coverage rose only marginally. 14
In order to guard against adverse selection, 5 individual private insurance was
unavailable to most and unaffordable even when people could qualify for it.
Medicaid did relatively little to relieve this misery. Grounded in cash welfare
traditions, 6 Medicaid essentially left out working-age adults unless they were
either totally disabled or caretakers of minor children. Pregnancy would later be
added as an eligibility category in its own right along with reforms for children,
and welfare reform enabled states to broaden coverage of parents. But in the main,
Medicaid excluded poor adults, even within those eligibility categories for which

18 HEALTH AFF. 62, 65 (1999). The trends found by Gabel persisted into the 21st century. See, e.g.,
Health, United States, 2013, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVs. 353 tbl.123 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus 13.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Sara Rosenbaum & Genevieve Kenney, The Searchfor a National ChildHealth Coverage
Policy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 2125 (Dec. 2014).
13. Health, United States, 2013 supra note 8, at 354 tbl. 123.
14. In 2012, for example, considering all sources of private health insurance, the proportion of
poor privately insured people stood at 16.5 percent (compared to 13.6 percent) while the proportion
of near-poor people with private coverage rose from 32.2 percent to 36.7 percent. Health, United
States, 2013, supra note 8, at 350 tbl.122.
15. TIMOTHY S. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER DRIVEN
MOVEMENT (2007).
16. ROBERT STEVENS

& ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY
(1974). The welfare philosophy underlying Medicaid was vividly on display in Chief
Justice Roberts' Medicaid opinion, which focused on the degree to which the ACA Medicaid
expansion departed from a philosophy of helping "the neediest among us," thereby imposing an
entirely "new program" on the states in an unconstitutionally coercive fashion. Nat'l Fed. of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-09 (2012).
OF MEDICAID
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federal funding was available, such as parents.' 7 A handful of states extended
Medicaid to poor adults through federal demonstrations undertaken pursuant to
section 1115 of the Social Security Act.' 8 But low-income, nonelderly adults were
relatively invisible in Medicaid unless they were fully disabled; as of 2012,
Medicaid reached only 52 percent of poor adults, and 30 percent of those who were
near-poor,' 9 and about 3 in 10 poor and near-poor adults remained completely
uninsured. 2' Furthermore, because of a phenomenon known as "churning"-the
rapid movement on and off various forms of insurance coverage-adults who did
obtain Medicaid rapidly lost it, victims of even slight shifts in life circumstances
such as income fluctuation, marriage, divorce, or a child reaching adulthood.2'
B. The Affordable CareAct
The ACA has utterly changed this picture for low-income adults, at least those
who are U.S. citizens or legal U.S. residents.22 By creating an affordable insurance
market, extending Medicaid to all nonelderly low-income adults with family
incomes up to 138 percent2 3 of the federal poverty level, 24 and establishing a
system of tax credits for persons with incomes between 100 percent and 400
percent of poverty and ineligible for minimum essential coverage through
employer plans or government insurance,25 the ACA uses Medicaid to create
coverage for the poor while building subsidized insurance next door.
Family income delineates the two markets down to the dollar: family income
up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level qualifies a 63-year-old woman for
Medicaid, while family income starting at 139 percent of poverty results in
17. Sara Rosenbaum, MedicaidandNationalHealth Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2009, 2010
(2009).
18. See John Holahan et al., Insuring the Poor Through Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers, 14
HEALTH AFF. 199 (1995).
19. See Health, United States, 2013, supra note 8 at 356 tbl.124.
20. Id. at 359 tbl.125.
21. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid and Marketplace Eligibility Changes Will Occur
Often in All States; Policy Options Can Ease Impact, 33 HEALTH AFF. 700, 700-01 (2014).
22. Thirteen percent of the uninsured remain ineligible for assistance under the ACA because
of immigration status. See How Will the Uninsured Fare Under the Affordable Care Act?, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8531-how-willthe-uninsured-fare-under-the-aca.pdf.
23. Technically, the Medicaid statute specifies 133 percent of poverty as the Medicaid eligibility
stopping point. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VI) (2012). However, the ACA's legislative
companion, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA), reset the upper income
threshold at 138 percent of poverty. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010
§ 1004(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1396e(14) (2012).
24. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 2001, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401, (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)
(2012)).
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subsidized private insurance. People entitled to Medicaid receive the full benefits
of Medicaid enrollment: the right to apply at any time; retroactive eligibility to
help with incurred medical bills; comprehensive coverage without cost-sharing;
and other benefits that are unusually broad. They also experience Medicaid's
shortcomings, in particular, greater problems with access to care, 26 although early
reports suggest that physicians in some regions of the country may be balking at
patients insured through Exchanges as well. 7
Low-income individuals who qualify for premium subsidies receive subsidies
toward the cost of coverage, as well as cost sharing assistance. Neither premium
subsidies nor cost sharing reduction assistance are what they should be for lower
income people. Using my home town of Alexandria, Virginia as an example, a 45year-old mother of two earning $39,600 in 2014 (203 percent of the federal poverty
level) 28 will still have to pay over $200 per month (more than 6 percent of her
monthly household income) for family coverage in 2015. Because her income
slightly exceeds twice the federal poverty level, her children will not qualify for
the Children's Health Insurance Program in Virginia, which the state cuts off at
200 percent of the federal poverty level. Furthermore, she will qualify for a family
health plan with only a 73 percent actuarial value, since the ACA's more generous
cost-sharing subsidy assistance ends at twice the federal poverty level. 29 This will
leave her facing steep cost-sharing for covered services as well as sizable
premiums. Even if we assume self-only coverage (because her children qualify for
public insurance) and a much lower household income-$27,000 (143 percent of

26. See, e.g., Robert Pear, For Many New Medicaid Enrollees, Care is Hard to Find,Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/us/for-many-new-medicaid-

enrollees-care-is-hard-to-find-report-says.html (reporting on a new report from the HHS Office of
the Inspector General examining managed care and health care access); see also State Standardsfor
Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERVS. (2014),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-11-00320.pdf.
27. ACA Exchange Implementation Survey Report, MED. GRP. MGMT. ASS'N. (May 2014),

http://www.mgma.com/govemment-affairs/issues-overview/aca/aca-exchange-implementationreport/aca-surveyreport online_2?ext-.pdf.

28. In this hypothetical the family has household income equal to 203% of the federal poverty
level for a family of 3 in 2014. Health Reform Subsidy Calculator, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/#state-va&zip=22314&income-

type=dollars&income=39%2C590&employer-coverage=0&people=3&altemate-planfamily=individual&adultcount=l &adults%5B0%5D%5Bage%5D=45&adults%5B0%5D%5Btobacco%5D=0&child-

count-=2&child-tobacco=0 (last visited Dec. 7, 2014). The Children's Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), known in Virginia as Family Access to Medical Insurance Security (FAMIS), subsidizes
insurance coverage for Medicaid-ineligible low-income children with household incomes up to twice
the federal poverty level. In Virginia, children in a family of 3 do not qualify if their household
incomes exceed 200 percent of the federal poverty level ($39,580 in 2014). For a family of 3, CHIP
eligibility ceases at $39,580.
29. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1402(c)(1)(B)(i), (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
18071 (2012)).
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poverty)-the woman in my example still would have to pay nearly $100 per
month for her own coverage. Were her income to drop below 139 percent of
poverty in Virginia, she would qualify for nothing, since Virginia is a non-adultexpansion state.
With the near-derailment of the adult Medicaid eligibility expansion by
Sebelius, the Medicaid expansion, initially projected to reach some 16 million
people when fully implemented, 30 has not worked as intended. As of November
2014, 23 states continued to refuse to extend coverage to poor adults, 3' who are
eligible for nothing at all if their incomes fail to reach the 100-percent-of-poverty
threshold that defines the subsidy entitlement; states' refusal to expand left an
estimated 4 million persons (85 percent of whom reside in the South) in what has
become known as the "coverage gap." 32 Despite this setback, the ACA has had an
enormous impact on insurance coverage for those of low income, especially in the
Medicaid expansion states, where the proportion of poor residents who were
uninsured fell by 4.7 percent.3 3
II. COMPETING VISIONS OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR Low INCOME
PEOPLE

The creation of complementary pathways to insurance for low and moderate
income people-Medicaid for the poorest, juxtaposed at the 138-percent-ofpoverty point with tax-subsidized private insurance for those with low and
moderate incomes-thus can be judged a landmark success. But real implications
for Medicaid also lie in this juxtaposition, especially for people who need coverage
far more extensive than what they will be able to purchase in the subsidized private
market, and for whom the subsidy system is insufficient to meet the cost of
necessary health care. Furthermore, below the surface of these two aligned
pathways to coverage can be found millions of low-income people who experience
income fluctuation to constantly move between Medicaid and the subsidized
private insurance market.
Although more detailed studies emerged after passage of the ACA, income
30. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Harry Reid, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/reid letter-hr3590.pdf.
31. Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: UninsuredPoorAdults in States That Do Not
Expand Medicaid-An Update, KAISER FAM.

FOUND.

(Nov. 12, 2014), http://kff.org/health-

reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaidan-update/. Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have expanded coverage. As of that
date, five of the Medicaid expansion states were proceeding with the expansion as part of a
section 1115 demonstration authority. Anita Cardwell & Kaitlin Sheedy, Where States Stand on the
Medicaid

Expansion,

STATE

REFORUM,

https://www.statereforum.org/Medicaid-Expansion-

Decisions-Map (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
32. Garfield et al., supra note 31.
33. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health Reform and Changes in Health InsuranceCoverage in
2014, 371 NEw ENG. J. MED. 867, 871 fig. 1, (2014).

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol15/iss1/11

6

Rosenbaum: Clash of the Titans: Medicaid Meets Private Health Insurance

CLASH OF THE TITANS

fluctuation, along with its consequences for health insurance coverage for lower
income populations, was already a well-known problem when the ACA was being
designed.34 A widely cited post-ACA study places the national chum problem over
the course of a year at 50 percent of low-wage workers.35 Yet another study
documents the problem of post-ACA churn in all states, even those that do not
expand Medicaid to include low-income adults.36 Indeed, in Massachusetts, home
of the ACA prototype, even after years of implementation experience, chum
continues to create breaks in coverage for a significant portion of the affected
has mitigated this problem by shortening the coverage
population. Health reform
37
breaks considerably.
The great advance of the ACA is that, as with Massachusetts, the law has the
potential to dramatically reduce periods without coverage. But the bifurcation of
the affordable insurance system means that breaks are essentially baked into the
design of the program unless effective mitigation strategies can be developed. And
coverage breaks are a major cause for concern-not only because of their
implications for the continuity and quality of coverage and care but also because
of their impact on risk estimates. As people cycle on and off coverage, the risk also
increases that they will delay necessary health care until insurance is subsequently
regained, a danger to their health and an added element of financial risk for the
private insurance market.
The problem of post-ACA chum-created by the use of dual, subsidized
coverage arrangements juxtaposed against one another but significantly different
in design and operation-was considered during the legislative process. But in the
intense atmosphere surrounding enactment, efforts to more meaningfully address
the problem were set aside. The principal mitigation strategy adopted was the
ACA's redesign of the process by which individuals enroll in coverage and retain
it.38 As we know, however, for a constellation of reasons-technical, operational,
political, structural-the American health insurance system is light years away
from the ideal of streamlined enrollment. Furthermore, streamlined enrollment
34. See, e.g., Gerry Fairbrother et al., How Stable is Medicaid Coveragefor Children?, 26
HEALTH AFF. 520 (2007); Pamela Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery-Powered Health
Insurance?Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured,22 HEALTH AFF. 244 (2003); Pamela Farley Short
et al., Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability of Health Insurance Shapes America's Uninsured
(2003),
Problem,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2003/nov/churn--chum-chum--how-instability-of-health-insurance-shapes-americas-uninsured-problem/short churn-688pdf.pdf.
35. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30
HEALTH AFF. 228 (2011).

36. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., supra note 21.
37. John A. Graves & Katherine Swartz, Health Care Reform and the Dynamics of Insurance
Coverage-Lessons From Massachusetts,367 NEW ENG. J. MED.1181 (2012).
38. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1413, 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (2012).
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does nothing to address the fact that two distinct subsidy systems-Medicaid along
with subsidized private insurance-might mean two entirely different supplier
markets.
The challenges posed by the creation of two distinct markets for coverage and
their implications-including the inadequacy of assistance for near-poor
families-might also have been lessened through use of the Basic Health
Program.3 9 Modeled after a pre-ACA program sponsored by Washington State, the
Program offers states the option of receiving per capita premium subsidy payments
(in lieu of having these subsidies flow directly to eligible individuals and families
through the Exchange), and to use the subsidies to effectively expand Medicaid
coverage to reach all people with incomes up to twice the federal poverty level.
The evidence suggested that such an approach would significantly smooth the
subsidy transition problem by pushing the point of chum higher, to a level at which
far more people qualify for employer coverage.40 It was also clear that the Program
would enable states to far more significantly assist lower income families. But the
Obama Administration delayed in implementing the Program; 4 as of fall 2014, no
state has moved ahead.
Since passage of the ACA, another strategy to reduce chum has emerged: that
of using multi-market health plans. In many markets, a distinct managed care
industry serves Medicaid, while companies specializing in subsidized private
insurance plans operate in the Exchange. The problem of distinct supplier markets
and their implications for a churning population received virtually no attention
during the legislative process. However, subsequent research suggests that
companies may now be developing multi-market strategies under which the same,
or linked, products are marketed and sold to families and individuals as a means
of reducing the care disruptions caused by chum. But the problem facing these
companies is building networks of providers willing to accept all plan members
regardless of source of subsidization, since the source of the subsidy (Medicaid
versus private insurance) almost always determines provider payment levels.42
Discussions during the legislative development process about how to mitigate
chum through state options building on the program's historic flexibility to
39. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012).
40. Ann Hwang et al., Creationof State Basic HealthPrograms Would Lead to 4 PercentFewer
People ChurningBetween Medicaidand Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314 (2012).
41. Final regulations implementing the Basic Health Program (BHP), a complex program that
requires complicated funds transfers between federal and state governments, were not issued until
2014. See Basic Health Program: Federal Funding Methodology for Program Year 2014, 79 Fed.
Reg. 13,887 (Mar. 12, 2014). It was not clear whether the Administration simply was unable to
develop implementation standards in time or sought to discourage the removal of lower income
workers from the Exchange pool out of concern about the impact of doing so on the viability of
Exchanges.
42. Sara Rosenbaum, Addressing Medicaid/MarketplaceChurn Through Multi-Market Plans:
Assessing the Current State of Play 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 233 (2015).
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purchase private health insurance4 3 might have gotten some traction had it not been
for the problem of cost. Allowing Medicaid under certain controlled circumstances
to purchase coverage from private health plans inevitably entails a significant
increase in costs because of the marked differential between Medicaid provider
payment and rates paid by private insurance.4 Just how big an investment would
be needed to position Medicaid to purchase Exchange coverage was not known,
since the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) never released formal cost
estimates. But the magnitude of the additional spending that would be needed
became clear following Sebelius, when CBO re-calculated the financial impact on
the federal government of states' refusal to expand Medicaid. The CBO concluded
that the absence of a Medicaid expansion would result in the movement into the
Exchange of millions of people with incomes between 100 percent and 138 percent
of the federal poverty level, and that per capita spending for this population would
be 50 percent higher on average.45 This estimate exposed the fact that the Medicaid
expansion was a principal means by which federal outlays for low-income people
had been contained.
III. THE SECTION 1115 PROCESS POST-SEBELIUS
Here matters would have sat but for section 1115 of the Social Security Act,
which enables the HHS Secretary to waive certain, otherwise-applicable
provisions of law governing Medicaid and other state grant-in-aid programs in
order to carry out an "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of' the
program in question. 6 With a long and storied history, section 1115 was put to
work in order to overcome the terrible blow of Sebelius while also permitting states
to do the very thing originally discussed during the legislative process but set aside.
Essentially, this redesigned the point of contact between Medicaid for the poor and
a private insurance market poised to surge into being.
Predating Medicaid's enactment, section 1115 has long been a source of
energy for propelling dynamic program change. The most obvious example of this
tendency is that the Medicaid amendments of 1997, 47 which vastly reshaped the
Medicaid managed care legislative framework, rested heavily on a series of section
43. Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 6.
44. See Peter Cunningham & Ann S. O'Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage
Medicaid ParticipationBy Physicians?, 28 HEALTH AFF. w17 (2009). Physician acceptance of
Medicaid patients historically has been depressed, with payment levels presumed to play a major,
but by no means the only, role in low participation. See MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 123 (Mar. 2011).
45. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 4 (2012).

46.42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012).
47. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4757(a), 111 Stat. 251, 527.
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1115 Medicaid managed care demonstrations (some but not all of which combined
48
managed care structures with eligibility expansions for low-income adults)
conducted during the early years of the Clinton Administration. Despite many
problems,49 these large-scale mandatory-enrollment managed care demonstrations
showed that states could organize and run managed care systems, at least for
beneficiaries whose eligibility was based on low family income. The
demonstrations also paved the way for a gigantic Medicaid managed care
industry5" that would emerge in response to invitations to sell private-health-planlike products to government sponsors of health care for the poor.
Arkansas has become the poster child for the modem section 1115 pathway
to expanded Medicaid coverage. 5 In contrast to previous expansions, the Arkansas
model uses purchased private insurance rather than Medicaid managed care as the
means of achieving coverage. In this sense, Arkansas represents the ideal test case,
since the state lacked a large-scale Medicaid managed care market to begin with
and necessarily rested on an individual private insurance market. The model,
influenced by the post-ACA churning studies showing that most newly eligible
beneficiaries were working-age adults in relatively good health,5 2 was designed to
take advantage of the new insurance market while extending Medicaid to the poor.
In this way, the demonstration combined the tradition of Medicaid as the means of
insuring the poor with a resurgent private market.
It will be years before lawmakers can fully know the impact of the Arkansas
experiment on access, costs, and quality. But the Arkansas model contains
extremely important features53 that should guide future policymaking. First, the
model establishes Medicaid for all non-elderly low-income people who would
have qualified for Medicaid under the basic terms of the ACA. The state was not
permitted to proceed with this structure without agreeing to cover all non-elderly
low-income adults who would have qualified for Medicaid had the state expanded
the program under the ACA's original terms. In other words, the demonstration
achieved a dramatic reduction in the proportion of Arkansans without health
insurance precisely because it achieved coverage of the federally targeted
population under the ACA itself.
48. See Rosenbaum, supra note 17, at 2011.
49. See John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, 17 HEALTH AFF. 43
(1998).
50. By 2012 the industry was responsible for covering 60 million people. Medicaid Managed
Care:

Key

Data,

Trends

and

Issues,

KAISER

FAM.

FOUND.

(2012),

http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/8046-02.pdf.
5 1. Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 6, at 7-8.
52. See Short et al., supra note 34, at 4 (providing a profile of people most likely to chum.
Essentially, the high churning group consists of younger, whiter, healthier, married people without
children and with fairly high levels of education-in other words, just whom insurers want).
53. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to Andy
Allison, Dir., Ark. Dep't Hum. Servs. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CH1PProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/I 1115/downloads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf.
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Second, the Arkansas model effectively breathes life into the state's Exchange
by default-enrolling those who do not select coverage on their own into private
health plans.54 In this way the demonstration links hundreds of thousands of
healthy low-income Arkansans to coverage, using a compulsory system that
connects those entitled to assistance to a health plan and its network. The use of
private health plans to secure coverage for people entitled to Medicaid-as
opposed to a distinct Medicaid managed care industry that operates much like
private insurance-means that continuity of coverage and care are available
regardless of changes in family income that move an individual or family from
Medicaid to tax subsidies and back again. Because of the problem of deep medical
under-service across the state, its safety net providers are able to participate in
health plans. These plans are bound by the essential community provider network
requirement applicable to plans sold in the Exchange." Furthermore, for the time
being at least, the demonstration does not waive the special Medicaid payment
methodology for community health centers. This methodology, along with
Medicaid eligibility expansions, has propelled health centers to the nation's largest
system of primary health care for medically underserved communities and
populations.
Third, and intimately bound up with the second achievement, the
demonstration exempts from this compulsory private plan arrangement those
residents (estimated at around 20 percent of the population)56 who are deemed to
be "medically fragile" because of one or more conditions that limit health activity.
In other words, the design succeeds precisely because it introduces a pre-existing
condition exclusion of sorts. But in this case, the exclusionary tool is used simply
to determine the type of coverage an individual will receive, not whether coverage
will be available at all. To be sure, this screening mechanism makes the entire
enterprise attractive to the private insurance industry, which in turn avoids the
highest risk populations. However, such screening also insulates that part of the
newly eligible Medicaid population with the greatest health vulnerabilities from
the harsher terms of private coverage. It may be that such screening is less than
perfect in predicting higher health needs, but at least there is a tool whose impact
and accuracy can be evaluated.
Fourth, the demonstration preserves Medicaid's open-access feature, arguably
its single most important attribute. The fundamental principle of Medicaid
enrollment at any time, regardless of health need, remains intact. This safety net
feature is of incalculable value, even taking into account the special enrollment
54. Andrew Allison, Arkansas'sAlternative to MedicaidExpansionRaises Important Questions
About How HHA Will Implement New ACA Waiver Authority in 2017, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &

L. 1089 (2014).
55.42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(C) (2012).
56. Testimony of Andrew Allison before the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access
Commission (MACPAC), (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.macpac.gov/home/meetings/sept).
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57
periods established under the ACA.
Fifth, the terms of the demonstration guarantee the continuation of certain
benefits unique to Medicaid (early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment
for children and adolescents, highly accessible family planning services, nonemergency medical transportation), which have no equal in the commercial
insurance market. Finally, the terms and conditions of the demonstration ensure
that-again, at least at the moment-patient cost-sharing responsibilities remain
within established Medicaid boundaries. These boundaries hold Medicaid costsharing well below the level that insurers are imposing on the premium subsidy
population, even that portion of the population that receives the most significant
level of subsidization.
Two basic problems loom, however: cost and politics. It seems inevitable that
the Arkansas demonstration, by binding Medicaid premium payments to the
competitive rate for silver plans established within the state Exchange, will result
in costs that exceed what Medicaid would have spent for the same population under
traditional coverage arrangements. In order to adhere to the budget neutrality rules
that, by Executive action, have applied to section 1115 demonstrations since the

late 1970s, 58 the Administration essentially permitted the state to project

significant cost increases under traditional Medicaid. These cost increase
projections were based on the assumption that a surge in Medicaid enrollment
inevitably would have created pressure for provider fee increases in order to ensure
patient access to care. Not surprisingly, this decision by the Administration has
come under intense scrutiny by the General Accounting Office, 59 since it has
effectively "back-doored" the same spending increases that CBO flagged in its
post-Sebelius cost estimates.
The second cause for concern is the politics of premium assistance. Arkansas
potentially represents the high-water mark for the demonstration model. The
Arkansas demonstration features open enrollment, preservation of full Medicaid
benefits for the medically frail, no premiums, and cost-sharing held to Medicaid's
relatively modest levels. The model also maintains coverage of certain
supplemental benefits for beneficiaries receiving premium support, including free
choice of family planning benefits, comprehensive supplemental coverage for
children and adolescents up to age 21 (typically those with serious and chronic
health conditions), and non-emergency medical transportation. Furthermore, the
57. Having a Major Life Change? You May Qualify for a Special Enrollment Period,

HEALTHCARE.GOV BLOG (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.healthcare.gov/blog/special-enrollmentperiod/.
58. Section 1115 Demonstrations,MEDICAID.GOv, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHfPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/I 115/Section-I 115-Demonstrations.htmi (last visited
Nov. 2, 2014).
59. Katherine Iritani, HHS's Approval Process for Arkansas's Medicaid Expansion Waiver
Raises Cost Concerns, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.
(Aug.
8, 2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665265.pdf.
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demonstration preserves the special Medicaid payment mechanism for community
health centers, a core element of the U.S. health care safety net and a major source
of care for insured and uninsured patients alike. Preservation of these elementsin particular, Medicaid's safety net financing feature-is key. Indeed, if
Massachusetts' near-decade-long experience with health reform offers any lesson,
health reform will produce enormous achievements while still leaving
considerable gaps. States will still have a population of considerable size that
remains completely uninsured for longer or shorter periods of time owing to both
ineligibility for coverage (in the case of persons not lawfully present in the U.S.)
and breaks in coverage as a result of chum. There will also be a considerable lowincome population that, even if insured, continues to need health care (such as
vision and dental care) that remains uncovered by public and private health
insurance. This care will therefore be inaccessible to low-income populations in
that
the absence of community health centers or other publicly funded providers
60
can make primary health care available on a heavily discounted basis.
As other demonstrations have proceeded, the Arkansas model has lost a bit of
ground. Later demonstration proposals approved by HHS for Iowa, Pennsylvania,
and Michigan have included approvals to impose premiums on certain portions of
the demonstration population and eliminate benefits such as dental care for 19 to
21-year-olds.61 States routinely have sought to impose higher cost sharing than
permitted under Medicaid. Indeed, the second phase of the Arkansas
demonstration includes precisely this proposal, through the establishment of health
savings accounts coupled with higher cost sharing requirements that apply to the
poor.62
Although many states initially sought to limit the expansion to adults under
100 percent of the federal poverty level (the Exchange threshold), no state has yet
come forward seeking to limit the expansion to only certain newly eligible adults
falling within actuarial norms (i.e., excluding the medically frail). Nor has any state
sought to eliminate Medicaid's basic open access feature, although rumors persist
that such a proposal could be in the offing. Under section 1115, at least as
interpreted by the current Administration, these types of proposals almost certainly
would be rejected as not consistent with program goals. But the discretion to decide
60. Julia Paradise et al., ProvidingOutreach and Enrollment Assistance: Lessons Learnedfrom
Community Health Centers in Massachusetts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2013), http://kff.org/health-

reform/issue-brief/providing-outreach-and-enrollment-assistance-lessons-learned-from-communityhealth-centers-in-massachusetts/; Leighton Ku et al., How is the Primary Care Safety Net Faringin
Massachusetts? Community Health Centers in the Midst of Health Reform, KAISER FAM. FOUND.

(2009), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/report/how-is-the-primary-care-safety-net/.
61. Sara Rosenbaum & Carla Hurt, How States Are Expanding Medicaidto Low-Income Adults
Through

Section

1115

Waiver

Demonstrations,

COMMONWEALTH

FUND

(2014),

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2014/dec/how-states-are-expandingmedicaid.
62. See Allison, supra note 54.
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when a Medicaid demonstration advances Medicaid's objectives lies with the
Secretary as a matter of law.
The close scrutiny brought to bear on the cost of Arkansas' Medicaid
demonstration may signal the end of section 1115 premium assistance
demonstrations as generous as the Arkansas model. Yet as the Obama
Administration comes to a close, the temptation to get as many of the remaining
non-expansion states into the fold will be great. A "big tent" demonstration
strategy might provide some insurance against repeal efforts in a Republican
controlled Congress, but broadening section 1115 significantly beyond where the
Arkansas demonstration has taken the program is a risky business. Indeed, greater
leeway to reduce financial support and benefits could produce the opposite effect,
emboldening states and conservative lawmakers to demand broader state
flexibility to accomplish without demonstration authority what today can be done
only under the Secretary's special terms and conditions. In other words, this would
be a replay of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, but arguably with far greater
stakes. It could culminate in Medicaid adult expansion legislation that broadly
enables Medicaid's full conversion to premium assistance. Under such a scenario,
the ACA coverage and financial assistance standards might become the floor,
assuming that these standards survive.
There are, in fact, limits to how extreme a Medicaid makeover might be. For
one thing, the Arkansas demonstration shows willingness on the part of insurers
and networks to accept the poor, but only if the medically frail remain in Medicaid.
This should provide some protection against a wholesale route with exceptions
only for the nonelderly population that meets the Social Security Insurance
disability test. Under this scenario, Medicaid presumably would remain accessible
to those deemed inappropriate for a financing system that rests on principles of
private financial risk, whose most important risk mitigation tools-risk corridors
and reinsurance63 -are set to expire after 2016.
For another, there is the cost entailed in such a transformation. Just as both the
Government Accountability Office and the CBO have identified the relatively high
costs associated with Medicaid as premium support, any effort to move Medicaid
more decisively toward a premium assistance model inevitably will cost a good
deal. This is not insurmountable either, of course. There simply need to be cost
offsets. Securing funding for such a transition, if carried out with adequate
safeguards, may have a significant effect on opening access to health care for the
poor, at least in states in which insurers and their provider networks are willing
partners in a premium assistance model. But when one is considering policy
reforms in the land of the poor, offsets are hard to come by, and they have the
potential to be even more damaging than the immediate policy at hand.

63. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1341-42, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061-62 (2012).
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD

It is difficult to say with certainty where all of this will end up. There are a lot
of moving parts, and potentially, reforms that make it easier for states to use
Medicaid to purchase qualified health plans sold in the Exchange may carry a
larger price tag, for Medicaid at least. (This price tag could be offset by savings in
federal premium subsidies if the movement of the healthiest beneficiaries into
Exchange plans results in lower overall per capita costs for Exchange health plans).
But there are also two fundamental truths. The first is that the nation has decisively
moved away from the social contract principles that undergird Medicaid. And as
the entire nation seemingly drifts inexorably in the direction of high deductible
health plans that create huge holes in coverage, why should the poor not experience
the same thing? I used to be asked by reporters how Medicaid reforms might help
the populations that stood to benefit from them. Now I am asked why the poor
should have good coverage when most Americans do not.
The second fundamental truth is Medicaid's remarkable endurance. Over its
fifty-year existence, Medicaid has survived multiple near-death experiences and
endless rounds of reinvention. Its eligibility rules have been reconfigured, as have
its coverage parameters and delivery mechanisms. The program has struggled with
periodic crises that have their roots in ideology and a particular viewpoint
regarding what the government should invest in. But Medicaid has survived
because it must. In a very real sense, the entire market-oriented system of health
care financing-as seen clearly in the Arkansas model--depends on Medicaid's
ability to fund health care for those whom markets literally do not want to touch.
How well Medicaid rises to the new challenge of joining itself to a private
health insurance market, and whether its essential principles - comprehensive
coverage; protection of the poorest Americans against cost-sharing; and
availability at the time of need -- can survive remains to be seen. In an ideal world
the ACA might have met these issues head-on and would have attempted to frame
the point of juxtaposition in ways that gave these principles a somewhat better
chance at survival. But the ACA was not born in an ideal world, and so taking
Medicaid through its next iteration simply gets added to the to-do list.
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